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We analyze a dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium (DSGE) model with an externality through climate
change from using fossil energy. A central result of our paper is an analytical derivation of a simple
formula for the marginal externality damage of emissions. This formula, which holds under quite plausible
assumptions, reveals that the damage is proportional to current GDP, with the proportion depending
only on three factors: (i) discounting, (ii) the expected damage elasticity (how many percent of the
output flow is lost from an extra unit of carbon in the atmosphere), and (iii) the structure of carbon
depreciation in the atmosphere. Very importantly, future values of output, consumption, and the atmospheric
CO2 concentration, as well as the paths of technology and population, and so on, all disappear from
the formula. The optimal tax, using a standard Pigou argument, is then equal to this marginal externality.
The simplicity of the formula allows the optimal tax to be easily parameterized and computed. Based
on parameter estimates that rely on updated natural-science studies, we find that the optimal tax should
be a bit higher than the median, or most well-known, estimates in the literature. We also show how
the optimal taxes depend on the expectations and the possible resolution of the uncertainty regarding
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In this paper we specify and solve a global economy-climate model￿ a so-called integrated
assessment model (IAM)￿ based on a stochastic dynamic general-equilibrium (DSGE) ap-
proach. The main goal of the paper is to use this model to characterize optimal global
policy qualitatively and quantitatively. The background for the work and for our particular
approach is that there now is widespread consensus that human activity is an important
driver of climate change (see, e.g., IPCC report, 2007). However, there are great remaining
uncertainties, especially regarding how much global warming to expect, and how much dam-
age the warming will cause. We take the climate problem as given here and use conventional
estimates of how carbon emission drives global warming.
The e⁄ects of global warming and of policies to correct it are uncertain, are dynamic,
and last for a long time. They also have potentially large general-equilibrium e⁄ects, and
may crucially depend on technological change. These are the primary reasons why we use a
standard DSGE model of the economy augmented with the damages coming from burning
fossil fuel. The microeconomic foundations we use also allow welfare evaluation that obeys
standard economic principles: given any path of policy, we can compute the e⁄ects on human
welfare using the utility functions humans themselves use.
We ￿rst solve the social planner￿ s problem in our economy with the climate external-
ity, which is entirely global in nature. The key ￿nding is an analytical characterization
and derivation of a simple formula for the marginal externality damage of carbon dioxide
emissions. This social cost, expressed as a proportion of GDP, is a very simple function of
the basic parameters of the model. At any given point in time, it is equal to the expected
discounted value of the sum of future damages, weighted by carbon depreciation rates: at
time t + j only a fraction 1 ￿ dj of a unit emitted at t remains in the atmosphere (and,
hence, a⁄ects climate). We approximate, on quite solid grounds, these rates to be constant
(i.e., independent of the total stock of carbon in the atmosphere), but non-geometric: they
feature (i) rapid initial depreciation and (ii) slow subsequent depreciation, though (iii) with
an appreciable fraction of the initial unit remaining in the atmosphere forever. This for-
mula is very convenient as it shows that only discounting, damages, and carbon depreciation
parameters matter for the externality costs of emissions. More speci￿cally, future values
of output, consumption, and the stock of CO2 in the atmosphere all disappear from the
formula; and no knowledge about future technology, productivity, energy sources in use, or
population is needed in order to calculate the social cost!
The formula we o⁄er does require some assumptions, but we argue that these assumptions
are quite reasonable. The intuition for the result also follows rather straightforwardly from
understanding them. More speci￿cally, we make four assumptions to derive our result: (i)
period utility is logarithmic in consumption; (ii) current climate damages are proportional to
output and are a function of the current atmospheric carbon concentration with a constant
elasticity (a relationship that is allowed to vary over time/be random); (iii) the stock of
carbon in the atmosphere is linear in the past and current energy use (as mentioned above);
and (iv) the saving rate is constant. We discuss these assumptions in detail in the paper
and, in particular, discuss the robustness of the results to alternative assumptions (such as
2so-called threshold e⁄ects)￿ see Section 5.2.3.1 Under our maintained assumptions, the level
of output drops out of the formula as damages are proportional to output and the marginal
utility, at which these damages are evaluated in the future, is inversely proportional to
output. Quite importantly, our formula applies also when an alternative (clean) energy
technology is available, as well as when there is deliberate investment into developing such
a technology￿ when technology choice is endogenous.
The three key factors in our formula￿ damages, discounting, and depreciation￿ a⁄ect
the social cost/optimal tax as follows. Higher expected damages raise the social cost (as
a proportion of GDP). Our formula also reveals that it is the expected damage elasticity
that enters the calculation: a certainty-equivalence result in terms of this elasticity, even
though the utility function features risk aversion. A higher discount rate￿ we use a dynastic
population structure￿ lowers it. The carbon-cycle parameters in￿ uence the optimal tax in
the intuitively way as well. The longer CO2 stays in the atmosphere, the higher is the
optimal tax rate. As noted, technology growth does not matter for the social cost per GDP
unit. This is because there are two opposing e⁄ects which cancel exactly under our speci￿c
assumptions: higher future technology increases damages, which are proportional to future
TFP, but these damages are weighted by marginal utility, which is inversely proportional to
future TFP.
We then characterize competitive market outcomes with and without taxes. As our model
falls within the framework where Pigou￿ s general insights apply, we can easily construct a
sequence of taxes implementing the fully optimal allocation. The optimal per-unit tax on
emissions should, hence, be set to equal to the marginal externality cost of emissions.2 The
tax, as a proportion of output, is then given by the simple formula described above. Since
stochastics are allowed in our analysis, and since a form of certainty equivalence applies,
as discussed above, it is straightforward to see how future updates about the social cost
will cause the tax to vary. A simple, and reasonable, case is that where no transition
dynamics are expected for the damage elasticity parameter: the expected time path for
the damage parameter is constant, but upward or downward adjustments can occur. We
calibrate using two possible future outcomes￿ damages are high, or they are not so high￿
and the assumption that it takes time to ￿nd out whether they are high or low. Suppose,
then, that society learns at some future date that the value of the damage elasticity is high
(and will remain high). Then from that point on the marginal externality cost of emissions
has gone up, as must the optimal tax rate. This outcome embodies the idea that there is an
option value of waiting: not until we (potentially) ￿nd out that damages will be very high
is it necessary to use very high tax rates, and before then only the expected value of the
damage elasticity is relevant for the level of the tax.
The ￿rst part of the quantitative analysis is calculating the optimal tax using the simple
formula we derived. As these taxes depend only on the discount factor, the damage elasticity,
and the parameters of the carbon cycle and are independent of the other parameters of the
1Our model is non-linear and none of the results rely on linearization techniques.
2It also follows that one should subsidize the removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, if techno-
logically feasible, at the same unit rate.
3model, it is easy to evaluate them quantitatively. For the discount factor, we simply report
results for di⁄erent levels of discounting. For the damage elasticity, we follow Nordhaus
and Boyer￿ s (2000) estimates entirely, including the uncertainty expressed there. They use
a ￿bottom-up￿approach, adding dollar measures of a large variety of e⁄ects of droughts,
￿ oods, and storms caused by climate change, along with changes in biodiversity, and so on.
For the carbon-cycle (depreciation) parameters, we rely on estimates from Archer (2005).
We calculate the optimal taxes both before and after we have learnt the long-run value of
the damages. We express the tax per ton of emitted carbon at a yearly global output of 70
trillion dollars. It is useful to compare our quantitative results to two important and very
in￿ uential policy proposals in the literature: that in Nordhaus (2000, 2007) and that in the
Stern report (2007).3 These proposals amount to a tax of $30 and $250 dollars per ton of
coal, respectively. A key di⁄erence between the two proposals is that they use very di⁄erent
(pure) subjective discount rates. Nordhaus uses a rate of 1.5% per year; he motivates this
level mostly based on market measures. Stern, who adds an additional ￿moral" concern for
future generations, uses the much lower rate of 0.1% per year. For these two values of the
discount rate, the optimal taxes using our analysis are $56.9/ton and $496/ton, respectively.
Thus, our calculations suggest signi￿cantly larger optimal taxes than do each of these studies.
It is comforting that our damage estimate can be made consistent, quantitatively, with that
computed by Nordhaus, even though his model is di⁄erent in various ways￿ notably in his
assumptions on energy supply, adaptation, and technology￿ and requires numerical solution.
Nordhaus￿ s carbon cycle implies less carbon depreciation from the atmosphere in the short
run and that all emitted carbon eventually ends up in the deep oceans. Adapting our
carbon depreciation structure to replicate these features in Nordhaus￿ s model (as well as
approximating his assumptions of a lag in the e⁄ects of a change in atmospheric carbon
concentration on temperature and a higher utility-function curvature) yields an optimal tax
rate close to the one he proposed; we discuss this comparison in detail in Section 5.2.3 of
the paper. Our depreciation estimates, we believe, are entirely in line with updated natural
science research, as represented by the 2007 IPCC report and, more speci￿cally, Archer
(2005): about 20% of the emitted carbon stays ￿forever￿ (i.e., for thousands of years),
even though a signi￿cant fraction moves from the atmosphere to the biosphere and oceans
relatively quickly.
Moreover, the consequences of learning can be dramatic. With a discount rate of 1.5%,
the optimal tax rate if damages turns out to be moderate is $25.3/ton but $489/ton if they
are what Nordhaus refers to as ￿catastrophic￿ . For the lower discount rate used by Stern,
the corresponding values are $221/ton and a whopping $4,263/ton.
The second part of the quantitative analysis derives the energy use and the paths of
the climate variables such as the global increase in the temperature. This part, unlike the
calculations of the optimal taxes, requires additional model assumptions. It is, however, very
easy to solve the model; it is ￿almost￿possible to solve in closed form.4 We assume that
3Nordhaus￿ s estimate, moreover, is near the mode of a distribution of estimates which Tol (2008) derives
in an e⁄ort to summarize over 200 estimates in the literature.
4The simplicity is due to the fact that the law of motion for fossil fuel contains no other endogenous
4there are two sources of energy￿ oil and coal￿ and that these are perfect substitutes. Oil
is more e¢ cient than coal, extracted at zero cost, and is in ￿nite supply. Coal is extracted
using labor (at constant marginal costs) and is in in￿nite supply.5 This structure does deliver
constancy of saving rates and, thus, is consistent with our optimal-tax formula. Our results
are as follows. The no-tax market economy would empty our oil supplies in three decades,
whereas optimal taxation would let oil be used for ￿ve decades. Coal use (setting in after the
oil has run out) is twice as large in the market outcome as in the optimal outcome. That is,
signi￿cant quantity adjustments are needed to correct for the externality and reach optimal
allocations. We predict a market economy with a signi￿cant temperature increase around
2045, a rise that will peak at almost 7 degrees Celsius a little over 100 years from now. The
optimal allocation dictates a signi￿cant delay in warming, by about two decades, and a peak
of a little below 3 degrees Celsius. These predictions apply until we (possibly) learn that
the damage elasticity is either higher or lower than what has been assessed so far; if updates
arrive, these numbers have to be revised accordingly.
Our work is related to several literatures. The pioneering work in this area is due to
William Nordhaus (for a recent description of his modeling, see Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000).
In almost every way, the spirit of our modeling is entirely in line with the approach used by
Nordhaus. His main framework is a computational model called RICE￿ Regional dynamic
Integrated model of Climate and the Economy￿ or, in its earlier one-region version, DICE.
Nordhaus￿ s work has been particularly pioneering in two areas. First, informed by modern
climate and carbon-cycle modeling, he managed to summarize the key quantitative channels
from the economy to the climate with a rather parsimonious, and mostly linear, dynamic
system. This dynamic system is small enough that it can be embedded in a typical dynamic
growth model. Second, Nordhaus did extensive work aimed at summarizing the damages
from climate change. His modeling of these damages in RICE amounts to a multiplicative
term on aggregate production which is a function of the average global temperature. That
is, damages of various sorts are expressed as a production loss measure. The natural science
part of Nordhaus￿ s model is close to the state-of-the-art speci￿cation used by climate scien-
tists. Our natural-science model mostly follows that formulation; the key di⁄erences are in
the depreciation structure of carbon emitted into the atmosphere, as discussed above, and
in our assumption that the full temperature response to atmospheric carbon is immediate
(Nordhaus uses slower temperature dynamics; see our detailed discussion in Section 5.2.3
below). The economic part of Nordhaus￿ s model is a bit less standard as, for example, it
uses a ￿nite horizon and a less than full microeconomic structure of energy supply. It is,
therefore, somewhat di¢ cult to compare it with standard macroeconomic models, and com-
parative statics and dynamics require full non-linear model solution and are therefore harder
to interpret. Nordhaus is able to compute optimal tax rates, as those Pigou taxes that
implement the ￿rst best, but cannot straightforwardly compare the optimal allocation to
variables.
5The assumption of in￿nite coal supply should be interpreted as follows: there is enough coal that,
given that a cheap enough alternative technology will appear at some future date, coal will not command a
Hotelling rent.
5second-best alternatives, such as the market laissez-faire outcome or one with carbon taxes
that are less than fully optimal. Our approach is ￿rmly within the modern-macro tradition,
thus relying on explicit microeconomic foundations both in terms of consumers and ￿rms.
A byproduct of being able to deal explicitly with a tax (which, in our setting, is equivalent
to cap-and-trade policy), is that we do not need to include ￿abatement￿in our analysis.
Abatement is very often (e.g., in DICE) used as as a stand-in variable for policy (taxes and
other): the planner is assumed to be able to choose it, at some cost, in order to directly
in￿ uence emissions. Finally, another di⁄erence is that we explicitly incorporate uncertainty,
which can take a rich structure.6
The global economy-climate model that we construct in this paper can also be viewed
as a natural extension of non-renewable resource models along the lines of Dasgupta and
Heal (1974) and Stiglitz (1974), papers that appear to have been reactions to the oil shock
in 1973 and focused mainly on conditions under which consumption could be sustainable.
Compare to these papers, we include a climate externality, a carbon cycle, and consider
technological change. Quite importantly, our model is also an extension in that we study
a global competitive equilibrium with an externality, allowing us to discuss explicitly, with
standard welfare analysis, how economic policy could and should be used to correct this
externality. The prime purpose of the paper is indeed to characterize the optimal energy
taxes in the global decentralized equilibrium economy.
Another di⁄erence that we obtain, relative to important parts of the literature and the
policy discussions, regards the time path of taxes. As explained above, our estimate is
that the per-unit tax on emissions should, as a fraction of GDP, be constant (unless new
information about the parameters in the tax formula arrives). Interpreted in more standard
terms, as a percentage value-added tax, it will fall over time, to the extent fossil-fuel prices
are expected to grow faster than GDP￿ a feature of most available models, going back to
Hotelling￿ s famous formula (Hotelling, 1931): it should rise at the rate of interest, which on
average is above the rate of real GDP growth. Our prediction that taxes on value added,
absent any future upward revision of damage estimates, should be declining over time is also
a rather robust result.
Section 2 describes the model in generality as well as with more specialized assumptions.
It also partially characterizes the solution to the planning problem; our proposition charac-
terizing the marginal externality damage of emissions appears in Section 2.3. Section 3 then
looks at a decentralized world economy, allowing for taxes on emissions, and demonstrates
the optimal-tax result. In Section 4 we fully solve the model for two relevant special cases:
that with oil only and that with coal only. Section 5 then contains our quantitative analysis
(which relies on both oil and coal use). We discuss some obvious limitations of our work and
conclude in Section 6.
6Nordhaus￿ s work generated much follow-up research; we comment on how our work relates to this research
in the appropriate places in the text.
62 Optimal resource use
We begin by describing the general setting and the planning problem: how to optimally
allocate resources over time, taking into account how the economy a⁄ects the climate. We
￿rst describe a rather general economy, in particular with regard to the carbon cycle and
the di⁄erent sources of fossil fuel and their extraction technologies. Later on, we specialize
the analysis so as to arrive at transparent characterizations of the optimum. In the next
section of the paper, we study the market solution and show how, using a simple tax/transfer
scheme, the planning solution can be implemented.
2.1 The economy and the climate: a general speci￿cation
Time is discrete and in￿nite. The world is assumed to be inhabited by a representative






where the function U is a standard concave period utility function, C is consumption, and
￿ 2 (0;1) is the discount factor. The economy￿ s constraint in the ￿nal-goods sector is
Ct + Kt+1 = Yt + (1 ￿ ￿)Kt:
The left-hand side is resource use￿ consumption and next period￿ s capital stock. The ￿rst
term on the right-hand side, Yt, is the output of the ￿nal good, possibly net of the resource
cost of providing alternative sorts of energy. We do not introduce separate notation for
such alternative energy sources. The production of fossil fuel is described explicitly below
as taking place in a separate production sector. The second term, undepreciated capital, is
entirely standard.7
Output in the ￿nal-goods sector can be described by an aggregate production function
F1t:
Yt = F1t (K1t;N1t;E1t;St):
The arguments of F1 include the standard inputs K1t and N1t (capital and labor in the ￿nal
good sector), along with E1t; which denotes fossil fuel energy in the ￿nal sector in period t.
The sub-index t captures the possibility of technical change. Technical change can appear
in a variety of ways here, e.g., an overall increase in productivity, a changed transformation
technology across basic inputs (such as technical change saving on speci￿c inputs), or a
change in the ￿need￿ for fossil fuel (if a clean technology emerges). The possibility of
endogenous technology is discussed in Section 6.
Finally, we also allow a climate variable St to a⁄ect output. This e⁄ect could in general
be either positive or negative, and we use the word ￿damage￿with this understanding. We
focus on various sorts of damages that are all captured through the production function. We
7We assume zero adjustment costs for capital and that depreciation is geometric merely for simplicity.
7specify later how F1t depends on S. However, note that we view the climate to be su¢ ciently
well represented by one variable only: S is to be read as the global concentration of carbon
in the atmosphere, in excess of preindustrial levels. We argue that this is reasonable given
available medium-complexity climate models used in the natural sciences. These imply that
the current climate is quite well described by current carbon concentrations in the atmosphere
(e.g., lags due to ocean heating are not so important).8 We do allow the damages, or the
mapping from the atmospheric carbon concentration, to have a stochastic component but we
suppress it here for notational convenience. We discuss the stochastic component in detail
later in the paper. By making St an argument of production and not elsewhere￿ e.g., as a
direct argument of utility or of the depreciation of capital￿ we are taking a stand on the
nature of climate damages that is, arguably, more extreme than necessary. Aside from the
notational advantage of damages only appearing in one place, there are two main reasons
for this assumption: it allows the analysis to be simpler in certain important respects (see
the discussion of the marginal damages in Section 4 below), and it makes our analysis closer
to, and easier to compare with, Nordhaus￿ s RICE and DICE treatments.9
Turning to the origins of the fossil-fuel input, let the variable Rt denote the stock of
remaining fossil fuel at the beginning of period t (R0 > 0 is given). Letting Et ￿ 0 denote
the amount of fossil fuel extracted, it follows a law of motion
Rt+1 = Rt ￿ Et: (1)
Fossil fuel can be extracted using technology F2t represented as
Et = F2t (K2t;N2t;E2t;Rt;Rt+1): (2)
Here, K2t, N2t, and E2t are the capital, labor, and energy inputs used in the extraction
sector. The variables Rt and Rt+1 are included as arguments in the extraction cost function
in order to capture the costs of extracting fossil fuel. In general, the extraction costs depend
on how much fossil fuel remains before and after extraction in a given period.10 Each period,
the total available amount of each input is split costlessly across use in the two sectors:
K1t + K2t = Kt; N1t + N2t = Nt; E1t + E2t = Et: (3)
8Roe and Bauman (2011) analyze this and show that if the long-run sensitivity of the global mean
temperature to the CO2 concentration is high, it becomes important to take into account the temperature
lags due to the fact that the ocean heats more slowly than the atmosphere. We discuss the implications of
this mechanism in more detail below.
9As formulated above, the climate in￿ uences the economy by directly a⁄ecting output. This, of course,
is a simpli￿cation in several ways, as the documented damages from climate change also include, among
other factors, loss of life (which should appear through utility and makes labor input fall), deterioration in
the quality of life (arguably also expressible with a more general utility function), and depreciation of the
capital stock. How large these di⁄erent damages are and exactly the form they take is highly uncertain.
These damages should also include any resources used to prevent disasters and, more generally, to lessen the
impact of climate change on humans and human activity (such as increased spending on air conditioning
and on research aimed at adaptation and mitigation). The purpose of the present paper is not to push this
particular frontier, and for this reason we choose to utilize Nordhaus￿ s formulation.
10It is possible to write net production at t as a function only of Et and Rt without losing generality; we
include all three for expositional symmetry only.
8We do not include climate damages in the energy sector. We exclude it for the same
reason we exclude it elsewhere: we prefer to stay close to Nordhaus￿ s treatment so as to be
able to use his damage estimates and compare to his results. In general, of course, one would
expect damages also in this sector.
In reality, energy should be thought of as a vector consisting of di⁄erent energy sources,
such as oil and coal (and non-fossil energy sources too). It is straightforward, but nota-
tionally cumbersome, to study the multi-dimensional case in full generality. None of the
main analytical results in the paper depend on Et being a scalar, and it is easy to extend
the analysis when both Rt and Et are arbitrary vectors. In the quantitative section we will
explicitly consider a model with multiple energy sources.




where Et ￿ fE￿T;E￿T+1;:::Etg. This is a general form for what natural scientists refer to
as the carbon cycle. That is, the amount of carbon in the atmosphere at time t is a function
of how much fossil fuel has been extracted in the past. Here, t = ￿T represents some date
at which human emissions began. Later, we assume that L has a simple form that we argue
reasonably well approximates more complicated models of global carbon circulation.
2.2 Specializing some assumptions
In the section that follows we characterize the solution to the planner￿ s problem in the setup
described above. We provide a sharp characterization of the optimal growth problem and
the optimal carbon tax that implements it under the three assumptions that we discuss in
this section.
2.2.1 Preferences
First, we assume that the utility function is logarithmic.
Assumption 1 U(C) = lnC.
Logarithmic preferences are commonly used and rather standard. In the quantitative
section of the paper, we discuss robustness and argue that at the long time horizons that
we consider in this paper the implied values of risk aversion and intertemporal elasticity of
substitution are within a reasonable range.
2.2.2 Damages
Second, we turn to modelling damages. As we discussed above, the purpose of this paper
is not to break new grounds on modelling environmental damages. Rather, we use the
formulation used by Nordhaus and assume that damages are multiplicative:
F1t (K1t;N1t;E1t;St) = (1 ￿ D(￿tSt)) ~ F1t (K1t;N1t;E1t):
9Here, D is the damage function. It captures the mapping from the stock of carbon dioxide
in the atmosphere, St, to economic damages measured as a percent of ￿nal-good output. As
we discuss in detail below in Section 4, the D(￿S) mapping can be thought of in two steps.
One is the mapping from carbon concentration to climate (usually represented by global
mean temperature): the climate sensitivity. The second is the mapping from the climate to
damages. Both of these mappings are associated with signi￿cant uncertainty. For reasons
summarized in Roe and Baker (2007) and also explored in Weitzman (2009) and Roe and
Bauman (2011), because of there being feedback e⁄ects￿ a higher temperature can in￿ u-
ence the nature of energy balance￿ the distribution of climate sensitivities can reasonably
be thought of in terms of a distribution with quite fat tails.11 As far as damages are con-
cerned, we know relatively little, especially about the costs of signi￿cant climate change. We
summarize this uncertainty by introducing a stochastic variable ￿, which parameterizes how
a given atmospheric carbon concentration translates to output damages. This parameter
plays an important role in our calibration and for the quantitative results in this paper.
Unlike Nordhaus, we adopt a slightly di⁄erent functional form for D by assuming expo-
nential damages. As we show in the numerical section, our exponential-damage formulation
approximates Nordhaus￿ s formulation well.
Assumption 2 The production technology can be represented as
F1t (K;N;E;S) = (1 ￿ Dt(S)) ~ F1t (K;N;E)




S ￿ ￿ S
￿￿
and where ￿ S is the pre-industrial atmospheric CO2
concentration.
2.2.3 The carbon cycle
Third, we describe the carbon cycle.




(1 ￿ ds)Et￿s (5)
where ds 2 [0;1] for all s.
Here 1 ￿ ds represents the amount of carbon that is left in the atmosphere s periods
into the future. In RICE, Nordhaus also has a linear schedule but includes three stocks,
all containing carbon, and a linear exchange of carbon between them. It is possible to
11For example, the melting of ice reduces the earth￿ s capacity to re￿ ect sunlight. Letting x denote the
strength of this positive feedback, the long-run climate sensitivity depends on 1
1￿x: Symmetric uncertainty
about x thus translates into a skewed and fat-tailed distribution of 1
1￿x:
10show quantitatively that, for the kinds of paths considered by Nordhaus, a one-dimensional
representation comes close to his formulation. We discuss the comparison with Nordhaus￿ s
carbon-cycle formulation in more detail below.
While for the rest of the analytical section we do not need to take any stand of a particular
form of damages, it is useful to give an example of a tractable formulation of damages
that we use in the quantitative section. As we discuss in detail in section 5, a reasonable
approximation to the carbon cycle is a process under which a share ’L of carbon emitted
into the atmosphere stays there forever, a share 1 ￿ ’0 of the remainder quickly exits the
atmosphere into the biosphere and the surface oceans, and the remaining part decays at a
geometric rate ’. Such a process implies that 1 ￿ ds can be represented as
1 ￿ ds = ’L + (1 ￿ ’L)’0 (1 ￿ ’)
s : (6)
2.3 The planning problem
We now return to the general formulation in Section 2.1, state the planning problem, and
characterize the solution to it in terms of some key relationships that will later be compared










subject to (1), (2), (3), (4),
Ct + Kt+1 = F1t (K1t;N1t;E1t;St) + (1 ￿ ￿)Kt
as well as the non-negativity constraints. In the problem above, we suppress uncertainty for
notational convenience. As mentioned, damages are a function of the carbon concentration
with a random element ￿. In a full speci￿cation of the problem, histories of the random
outcomes of ￿, as de￿ned by ￿t ￿ f￿0;￿1;:::;￿tg, along with associated probabilities ￿(￿t),
would be spelled out explicitly instead of through the expectations operator.
Denote the constraint multipliers ￿
t￿1t (the shadow value of the ￿nal good at t), ￿
t￿2t
(the shadow value of energy production at t), ￿
t￿t (the shadow value a unit of carbon in the
atmosphere at t), and ￿
t￿t (the shadow value of the natural resource at t), respectively. We
do not introduce separate multipliers for the constraints summing up inputs across sectors
but rather directly state the implied conditions.




















The ￿rst-order condition for Kt+1 and Ct yield the standard consumption Euler equation
U







+ 1 ￿ ￿
￿￿
: (8)
11Turning to the choice of energy use and emissions, combining the ￿rst-order condition
for Et and E1t, one obtains
@F1t
@E1t














This ￿rst-order condition sets the marginal productive value of using fossil fuel (in period-t
utils), on the left-hand side, equal to the marginal production cost, measured as the direct
resource value of a unit of fossil fuel, ￿2t, plus the shadow value representing the scarcity
of the stock, ￿t, plus the marginal damage cost, ￿
s
t. The marginal damage cost, ￿
s
t, which
equals the expected present value of damages, including one in the present period t, plays
a key role in our analysis. This is the externality damage that markets do not take into




































Equation (11) is the central equation of this paper.12 In section 3, we show that ￿s
t is equal
to the optimal tax on the (emission) of the fossil fuel in competitive equilibrium. We now
turn to analyzing the properties of ￿s
t. Although the expression for ￿s
t in general depends
on the expectations about the future path of the endogenous variables and can be quite
complicated, it simpli￿es signi￿cantly under the assumptions made in section 2.2. Under the










￿t+j(1 ￿ dj): (12)
12The result that the marginal social damage (and, consequently, the optimal tax) is the discounted value
of future marginal damages is straightforward and is well known (e.g., Perman et al. 2003, chapter 16).
Withagen (1994) looks at an environment without physical capital and Grimaud et al. (2011) consider a
growth model with capital and directed technological change. The key here, as we discuss below, is the
simpli￿cation and analytical characterization of the components of this formula.
12The advantage of formula (12) is that it expresses the costs of the externality only in terms of
the exogenous parameters and the (endogenous) saving rate, along with initial output (since
Ct can be written as a saving rate times output). Based on predictions from optimal growth
models, we argue below that the e⁄ects of underlying trends (in technology, population, etc.)
on the saving rate are rather small in for a broad range of parameter values. In particular,
we show in sections 4 and 5 that several canonical models of resource extractions imply that
the social planner optimally chooses to keep the ratio Ct=Yt constant over time, regardless
of initial conditions. Thus, even if the saving rate is not literally constant over the entire
transition, the next proposition should provide a very useful benchmark for a large range of
growth models with a climate externality.
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 are satis￿ed and the solution to the social
planner￿ s problem implies that Ct=Yt is constant in all states and at all times. Then the














This proposition provides a simple formula for studying both the quantitative and qual-
itative properties of the marginal externality cost of emissions. We also show in Section 3
below that the per unit extraction tax that implements the optimal allocation is precisely
equal to the marginal externality cost of emissions: the Pigou tax. The marginal externality
cost of emissions as a proportion of GDP is a very simple function of our basic parameters.
The simplicity of the formula makes clear that￿ absent a dependence of the expected ￿ on
time￿ the marginal externality cost of emissions as a proportion of GDP inherits the time
path of GDP. Quite critically, future values of output, consumption, and the stock of CO2 in
the atmosphere all disappear from the formula. Thus, no knowledge about future technology,
productivity or population is needed in order to calculate the marginal externality cost of
emissions per GDP unit.13
The intuition for this important result is quite transparent. While damages are propor-
tional to output, marginal utility is inversely proportional to output. Thus, whatever makes
consumption or output grow (such as growth in TFP) will have exactly o⁄setting e⁄ects:
damages will be higher, but due to decreasing marginal utility the value in terms of current
consumption is not a⁄ected. We discuss natural departures from the result￿ say, if utility is
not logarithmic￿ in our robustness section below.
13There are analytical results in the literature worth mentioning in this context, most of which are in a
partial-equilibrium context. One can be found in Uzawa (2003), who considers a dynamic model in which
pollution damages enter utility but in which there is no exhaustible resource; he shows that the optimal
carbon taxes are proportional to income. Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003) derive a formula for damages in an
environment with linear utility of consumption in which the emission to output ratio changes exogenously.
Goulder and Mathai (2000) also make some headway based on the exponential damage formulation. In
various studies, Hoel also exploits implications of constant marginal damages (e.g., Hoel, 2009).
13Moreover, we see exactly how the di⁄erent basic parameters matter. The higher expected
damages raise the marginal externality cost of emissions as a proportion of GDP. A higher
discount rate lowers it. The carbon-cycle parameters in￿ uence the optimal tax in the intuitive
way as well: the longer the CO2 stays in the atmosphere (through an increase in 1￿dj), the
higher is the marginal damage cost.
This formula simpli￿es further if we assume that the expected time path for the damage



















We now consider the optimality conditions for extraction assuming that the optimal Rt





































This equation can be interpreted in terms of the choice between burning a marginal unit of
fossil fuel at t or at t+1. The left-hand side gives the net bene￿t of burning a unit at t: the
productive value of energy less the production cost minus the damage cost. The production
cost is given by 1 +
@F2t
@Rt+1, a number greater than one since depleting the stock raises the
cost, times ￿2t=￿1t, capturing the relative value of energy in terms of consumption. The
right-hand side gives the corresponding net bene￿t at t + 1, discounted to period-t utils.
This equation characterizes e¢ cient fossil-fuel use over time.
In the quantitative section of the paper we argue that for a realistic calibration of fossil-
fuel supply it is useful to think of two regimes: (1) the regime in which a fossil-fuel source
in sharply limited supply￿ oil￿ is mostly used, and (2) a regime in which mostly coal (or
nuclear energy, if we appropriately modify the damage function), where the supply is large
enough to at least last for a couple of hundred years. In the second case, the relevant point
of transition into a ￿future￿phase is likely not one where coal runs out but one where it is
replaced by some alternative non-fossil technology. We assume that this occurs far enough
into the future so as to not radically alter the medium-run implications of our model.
When the resource is not in limited supply, F2t does not depend on Rt or Rt+1. This case









t = 0, for all t:
This is a version of (15) which is not dynamic in the sense of relating energy use at t to that
at t + 1, since the resource is not in limited supply.
14As long as no alternative technology for energy production becomes available, this condition is satis￿ed.
The emergence of backstop technologies is the key alternative case. Whereas a backstop technology in use
would not a⁄ect the formula for the marginal externality cost of emissions￿ unless it in￿ uences the saving
rate￿ it will imply di⁄erent conditions during at least one time period than in what follows.
14In the oil regime (when the supply is limited) there is a trade-o⁄ between fossil-fuel
energy use over time. We use equation (15) to develop an important interpretation of this




































+ 1 ￿ ￿
￿￿
: (16)
This equation states that the accumulation of the two stocks￿ capital and (unused) fossil
fuel￿ have to yield the same expected, marginal utility-weighted return. The return from






















taking into account the social costs of emitted carbon, ￿s. We can think of this as a portfolio
choice problem. The wealth should be split into capital, on the one hand, and, on the other,
fossil-fuel resources left in the ground in such as way as to equalize social returns. When


















+ 1 ￿ ￿:
The total social return to leaving a unit of fossil fuel in the ground for one more period is
equal to the return to capital. This is also a generalization of the original Hotelling formula
in that it includes a damage cost ￿s which is internalized by the planner but not by the
market. In the market equilibrium, which we study below, the return from saving fossil fuel
is di⁄erent, as the ￿ss does not appear￿ these costs are not internalized.
3 Market outcomes
The previous section characterized the solution to the social planner￿ s problem and derived
the expression for the emission externality ￿s
t: In this section, we show that ￿s
t is equal to the
optimal tax on carbon emission that the government can impose in a competitive equilibrium
to achieve the optimal allocations. The competitive equilibrium as de￿ned here is also what
underlies our quantitative analysis below comparing laissez-faire equilibria with those where
taxes are set optimally.
153.1 Decentralized equilibrium
3.1.1 Consumers









qt (Ct + Kt+1)=E0
1 X
t=0
qt ((1 + rt)Kt + wtNt + ￿t + Tt);
where rt is the (net) rental rate of capital, wt is the wage rate, and ￿t are the pro￿ts from
the energy sector which (in general) are positive because ownership of the scarce resource
has value. We assume perfect competition among energy ￿rms. There is a large number of
(identical) owners of the resource all producing at the same marginal cost. The assumption
of perfect competition in oil is not ideal but serves as an important benchmark. For coal, this
assumption is a better representation of reality. The assumption that all oil wells/coal mines
are identical is for convenience only. It is straightforward but notationally cumbersome to
consider heterogeneity across wells/mines and a gradual switching across them according to
their relative pro￿tability; our key results would not be a⁄ected. The consumption sector
is competitive and has no rents from any scarce resource and, hence, delivers zero pro￿ts
in an equilibrium. Denote by Tt government transfers. We assume that the present value
of the transfers is equal to the present value of the tax revenues. We use probability-
adjusted state-contingent prices of the consumption good. Let Qt(￿t) denote the price of
consumption goods in state ￿t at time t in terms of consumption goods at time 0. De￿ne q
from ￿(￿t)qt(￿t) ￿ Qt(￿t). As in the planning problem above, we suppress ￿t in our notation
whenever possible.
There are two ￿rst-order conditions of interest here. The ￿rst condition is for consumption








The second one, that for Kt+1, delivers (using the price characterization above):
U
0 (Ct) = ￿IEt [U
0 (Ct+1)(1 + rt+1)]: (17)
3.1.2 Producers
There are two types of ￿rms. The consumption-good ￿rm uses technology F1t(K1t;N1t;E1t;St)
to produce the consumption good. A representative ￿rm in this sector solves
max
K1t;N1t;E1t
F1t(K1t;N1t;E1t;St) ￿ ￿K1t ￿ rtK1t ￿ wtN1t ￿ ptE1t;
where pt is the price of fossil fuel.
16A representative, atomistic resource extraction ￿rm owns a share of fossil-fuel resources.
Denote a per-unit tax on the resource of ￿. The problem of a representative resource extrac-







qt ((pt ￿ ￿t)Et ￿ (￿ + rt)K2t ￿ wtN2t ￿ ptE2t);
subject to (1) and (2). The ￿rm makes date- and state-contingent decisions as above. How-
ever, we suppress the stochastic shock for convenience.
Let ￿t be a Lagrange multiplier on (2). Then the ￿rst-order conditions for the ￿rms in












































and thus ￿ is the equivalent of ￿2=￿1 in the planner￿ s problem.
We turn next to the resource extracting ￿rm￿ s only dynamic choice. Combine the ￿rst-
order conditions with respect to Rt+1 and Et to obtain


















This is our market version of Hotelling￿ s formula. The original Hotelling rule, derived in
Hotelling (1931), applied to a monopolistic resource owner but, essentially, stated that the
price of the resource less its marginal production cost grows at the real rate of interest.15
Our formula, which has uncertainty and, therefore, is stated as an asset-price condition,
extends the original rule. The (net-of-tax) market price of the resource less its marginal
production cost at t is equal in expectation to the discounted value of of that tomorrow.
Without uncertainty, we obtain the original Hotelling￿ s formula, since then qt+1=qt is not
random and equals the inverse of the gross interest rate.
15Solow (1974) and Stiglitz (1974) derive an analogous condition for the case of perfect markets and no
externalities, in which case the market implements the optimal extraction path. Finally, Sinn (2008) shows
how to include an externality in the condition, arguing that this naturally leads to slower extraction than in
laissez-faire.
173.2 Optimal taxation
It is straightforward now to derive the optimal tax formula that implements the ￿rst best
allocation. Taxes implementing the optimal allocation have to be set to equal the externality.
Private decision makers have to pay for the social cost of burning fossil fuel. Formally,
substitute expressions for pt and ￿t from (20) and (21) into (22). Comparing the resulting




then the optimality condition (22) for the ￿rm coincides with the optimal resource extraction
equation (15) in the social planner￿ s problem. It is straightforward to show that if the
proceeds are rebated lump-sum to the consumers all necessary conditions for competitive
equilibrium coincide with those in the solution to the planner￿ s problem. We summarize this
result in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose ￿t are set as in (23) and the tax proceeds are rebated lump-sum to
the representative consumer. Then the competitive equilibrium allocations coincide with the
solution to the social planner￿ s problem.
The per-unit oil (or emission) tax is not the only way to implement the optimal allocation.














t)(ptEt ￿ (￿ + rt)K2t ￿ wtN2t ￿ ptE2t):
Knowing optimal ￿t one can always ￿nd the equivalent value added tax: ￿v
t = ￿t=pt. Since
taxes are often thought of in sales (percentage) units, it is important to note here that a unit
tax that, as in our benchmark case, is a constant times GDP will translate into a percentage
sales tax which is decreasing over time so long as the price of oil rises faster than does GDP.16
In the typical optimal-growth solution, this is indeed the case.
4 Emissions in oil and coal regimes
We now use the assumptions in Section 2.2 above to further characterize the optimal tax
policy and allocations. Throughout this section, we assume that Assumptions 1, 2, and 3









16Sinn (2008) shows that optimal tax rates on fossil fuel in limited supply should fall over time under
realistic assumptions about extraction costs.
18and full depreciation of capital. We discuss the plausibility of these assumptions, and how
the results change if we depart from them, below; for long enough time periods, we argue
that the assumptions are not entirely implausible. For the source of energy, we use the two
cases discussed above: (1) oil and costless extraction up to a ￿nite amount, and (2) coal in
in￿nite supply but with extraction costs in the form of a constant marginal labor cost. In
the second case, equation (2) becomes
Et = ActN2t: (25)
We argue in the quantitative section that these two cases provide useful insights into the
behavior of a more realistic model with various sources of energy.17
To summarize, we consider the following planning problem (and associated laissez-faire























Both models, which we refer to as our oil and coal regimes, are similar to the neoclassical
growth model. As in the neoclassical growth model without endogenous energy determina-
tion, the saving rate is constant in the optimal solution:
Kt+1 = ￿￿Yt:
The proof is standard so we omit it and just state the implication of this result in the
following proposition. Equilibrium energy use will also satisfy this condition, whether or not
the tax rate is set optimally.
Proposition 3 At the optimum of the oil and coal regimes, Ct=Yt = 1 ￿ ￿￿ for all t. The
optimal (per-unit) tax on emission is given by (13).
This proposition implies that in both of these cases the optimal tax is easy to compute
as a function of exogenous variables. In the rest of this section we show the e⁄ect of taxes
on emission and equilibrium allocations and compare the dynamics of emission to that in
laissez-faire.
17Early studies along these lines include Chakravorty et al. (1997).
194.1 Emissions in the oil regime
In the oil regime when there are no extraction costs, a simple version of equation (22) holds:







Using equation (20) together with the Cobb-Douglas speci￿cation (24) we obtain that pt =















This formula allows us to make several observations. First, in a competitive equilibrium
with zero taxes, Et+1 = ￿Et, or Et = ￿
t(1 ￿ ￿)R0. In each period, thus, independently of
the initial conditions, energy consumption is falling over time at the rate of discount.18
Second, consider the case when ￿=Y ￿ ^ ￿ is constant. From Propositions 1 and 2 this is
the case when, for example, the damage coe¢ cient ￿t is constant, and the government uses
the optimal tax on emission. In this case
Et+1 =
￿Et
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)^ ￿
￿Et
; (26)
so that E falls more slowly, for all t, than under competitive equilibrium with no taxes, and
asymptotically falls at a rate ￿. Because it falls more slowly, since energy use has to add up
to the total available resource, we conclude that the initial use of energy is at a lower level.
The intuition is as follows. The Hotelling equation shows that pt￿ ^ ￿
￿ has to grow at the rate
of interest. Since costs do not grow, it is bene￿cial to postpone extraction. The price path
involves a higher initial price but a growth rate that is lower, eventually converging to the
rate of interest.
Third, consider a tax on energy that is not in per-unit terms but raised as a percentage of
value, i.e., then tax ￿v de￿ned in section 3.2. With no extraction costs, the after-tax pro￿ts
in the oil-extracting sector in each period are (1￿￿v
t)ptEt. First, suppose ￿v
t is constant over
time. Then there is no e⁄ect at all on allocations: a constant factor 1 ￿ ￿v drops out of the
Euler equation. A constant value-added tax does not a⁄ect the intertemporal decisions of
the ￿rm, and hence has no e⁄ect on allocations, no matter how high this tax is. A value-
added tax rate that is decreasing over time, however, is equivalent to the per-unit the taxes
discussed above. If the optimal allocations are such that the per-unit tax indexed to GDP is
constant, value-added tax rates that implement the optimal allocation have to be decreasing
over time in order to make the economy postpone extraction.19
18With preferences exhibiting constant relative risk aversion, the rate at which Et falls depends on initial
conditions. Asymptotically, the rate at which Et falls is equal to ￿ adjusted by a consumption growth factor.
19This is the result in Sinclair (1992, 1994), who shows that without extraction costs the optimal value
added taxes must be decreasing.
20Finally, note that in the competitive equilibrium with zero taxes all of the oil resource
is used up, given that there are no extraction costs and that oil is essential in production.
However, although this has been presumed in the discussion above, this need not be the case
on the optimal plan. The marginal bene￿ts from oil are declining due to decreasing marginal
productivity. The marginal costs may either increase or not decline as fast, depending on the
speci￿c damage function used. Indeed, if it is not optimal to extract all the oil, the tax on
oil will be equal to its price, pt = ￿t = ￿s
t so that all rents are taxes away from the resource
extracting sector. To ￿nd out whether it is indeed optimal to extract all the oil, one solves
the stochastic di⁄erence equation above, including the condition that Et+1 = Rt ￿ Et ￿ 0,
with a given R0. As we increase R0, the energy use goes up. For a high enough R0, the net
social value of energy becomes zero, i.e., ￿
E ￿ ^ ￿s = 0 (or, similarly, for a given R0, the value
is zero for a high enough marginal damage). At that point, it is optimal to not use all the
oil and simply set E to solve this equation.
As we argued above, uncertainty plays an important role in evaluating future damages.
Our analysis allows an easy incorporation of stochastic damages. The optimal energy se-



















= ￿ ￿t for all j, i.e., where
the expected time path for the damage parameter is ￿ at. Then ^ ￿s
t is ￿ ￿t times a constant.
The special case where the expected future time path is ￿ at is useful as an example since
we can think of the future as embodying two possibilities￿ damages are very high, or not so
high at all￿ and that it takes some time to ￿nd out what ￿ will be. Suppose that society,
at some future date, learns the value of ￿, and that it will remain very high. Then from
that point on we can compute the new damage ^ ￿s















Similarly, one can solve this equation for a lower value, ^ ￿s
lo. It is easy to see that E will
begin at a lower level and fall more slowly when ^ ￿s takes the higher value: higher damages
demand lower current energy use, i.e., a postponement of energy use to future times. The
intuition, again, is that when the marginal damage cost is a constant times GDP, it is optimal
to extract more later, and the higher this constant cost is, the stronger is the incentive to
postpone.
Of course, the possibility of a high damage cost in the future will in￿ uence optimal energy
use today. Our functional forms imply, however, that there is a certainty-equivalence of sorts
at work here: current policy/optimal energy use will depend on the expected path for ￿ only.
This is true despite our model featuring true risk aversion; ￿, rather, can be interpreted as
the percentage marginal damage cost, and it turns out that this parameter is key for policy.
The optimal policy will feature high taxes on energy now if a high cost is perceived, but if
21the perception later changes to an even higher cost, the policy of course will react and raise
taxes then. In other words, there is an option value of waiting as part of optimal policy.
4.2 Emissions in the coal regime
We now characterize emissions in the coal regimes. We start with the social planner￿ s








t = 0; (27)
i.e., so as to make the net bene￿t of coal production equal to zero (since there is an in￿nite
supply of coal and, thus, no coal rent). This equation is derived from equation (9) with the


























t is de￿ned in equation (14). This is a second-order polynomial equation in Et whose




















We can compare this emission level to that in the laissez-faire regime. Under laissez-
faire, emission is determined by equation (14) in which ^ ￿s
t is set to zero in all periods. The
laissez-faire emission E
lf





1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿v
t
: (30)
Several observations about (29) and (30) are in order. In both the social planner￿ s problem
and in the competitive equilibrium with zero taxes, the quantity of coal consumption will
be increasing in the productivity of coal extraction, the technology parameter Act, and the
population level Nt. In particular, as long as the product ActNt grows, which is reasonable
to assume, coal use increases over time. However, there is a fundamental di⁄erence in the
behavior of emissions in the optimum and in the laissez-faire case. In the optimal allocation,
coal extraction will remain ￿nite. Speci￿cally, it will converge to the value to which ￿=^ ￿s
t
converges. Intuitively, when AcN goes to in￿nity, the marginal production cost goes to zero
(as a fraction of output), and since the remaining cost of using coal￿ the social cost, i.e.,
22the climate externality￿ is a positive constant (fraction of output), coal use could not go
in￿nity. Because of a diminishing marginal product of coal, if coal use were to increase
without bound, its marginal bene￿ts would be zero eventually, and would thus be lower than
the damage costs. Hence, coal use must converge to a ￿nite level.
The opposite occurs in the laissez-faire regime. Equation (30) shows that as ActNt grows,
coal use will be ever-growing and unboundedly large. Thus, there would be a radical di⁄er-
ence, both in energy use, climate outcomes, and welfare, between the optimal allocation and
the laissez-faire equilibrium. Of course, coal resources are ￿nite, and ever-growing extraction
is not possible. However, our view is that in, say, two hundred years one would expect a
￿backstop technology￿ , i.e., a non-fossil alternative that is economically pro￿table, to be
available. At that time, unless the coal extraction technology is improving at a fast rate,
there will still be coal left according to our estimates (for a discussion see Section 5), and
thus there is really no coal scarcity, as assumed above. Moreover, if a viable backstop tech-
nology becomes available with probability one some time before the coal is exhausted (when
its extraction follows formula (30)), the two models give identical predictions for extraction
path as long as coal is used. In such a case, moreover, the radical di⁄erences between the
optimum and the laissez-faire outcome become less radical.
4.3 Prices in the oil and coal regimes
What is the expected long-run price development for fossil fuels? The answer to this question
can be of relevance for assessing the possibility that alternative energy technologies are
developed by market forces alone, and for energy-saving technical change. The endogenous
response of technology to price developments is a very important issue that we do not address
here; there are many analyses of such issues, including the early Bovenberg and Smulders
(1995, 1996) studies as well as recent studies like Acemoglu et al. (2010), Hartley et al.
(2011), as well as Hassler, Krusell, and Olovsson (2011) are focused more singularly on these
questions. Nevertheless, it is useful to note, for these reasons, what the price implications
are in the models presented here.
Merely summarizing the above results, then, we note that oil prices must rise, in ex-
pectation, at the rate of interest (which, in turn, exceeds the growth rate of output). The
fundamental reason for this is the rent originating in the ￿niteness of the supply, but the
assumption of zero extraction costs plays a role as well. As we saw, with positive costs,
prices do not exactly grow at the rate of interest; if marginal costs are positive and grow at a
slower rate than the rate of interest, the price of the resource will grow at a slower rate than
the rate of interest. Coal, in reality and as we represent it here, has a signi￿cant marginal
cost of production and its price should therefore rise at a much slower rate. The fact that we
assume that coal has no rent here plays a role as well but due to the high extraction costs it
is likely a secondary factor; we conjecture that a model where coal would run out (in, say,
200-300 years) would deliver price implications very similar to those obtained here. The coal
price develops according to ptAct = wt: it grows more slowly than wages (and output) to
the extent there is technological change in coal extraction.
235 Quantitative analysis
We ￿rst discuss the calibration and then turn to the results.
5.1 Benchmark calibration
For our calculation of the marginal externality cost of emissions, since we can base our analy-
sis on the derived closed-form formula, we only need to calibrate three sets of parameters:
those involving the damage function (￿ and its stochastic nature), the depreciation struc-
ture for carbon in the atmosphere (the ￿s), and the discount factor. Thus, the remaining
calibration￿ of the precise sources of energy, technology growth, etc.￿ is only relevant for the
generation of speci￿c paths of output, temperature, energy use, and so on or for discussion
of robustness of the benchmark results.
5.1.1 Preferences and technology
We ￿rst calibrate the parameters relevant for the optimal tax formula, since this formula
holds rather generally and, in particular, does not depend on the details of the energy
supply. We assume logarithmic preferences and a Cobb-Douglas speci￿cation of technology
(24). Each period is 10 years. We assume full depreciation of capital each period.
Logarithmic utility may not re￿ ect everyone￿ s preferred assumptions regarding the elas-
ticity of intertemporal substitution or risk aversion but it is commonly used and, even,
standard. A long time period (10 years) should suggest lower curvature too; thus, even if
one would argue for a higher curvature in an annual model, logarithmic curvature on the
horizon studied here is probably not altogether unreasonable. A depreciation rate of 100%
is too high, even for a 10-year period. We also solved versions of the model with a lower
depreciation rate and the results did not change markedly. In particular, the key for the
optimal tax formula to hold is a constant saving rate, and it continues to be very close to
correct. Cobb-Douglas production is perhaps the weakest assumption. Though it has been
widely used and defended, in particular in papers by Stiglitz (1974) and Dasgupta and Heal
(1974), Hassler, Krusell, and Olovsson (2011) argue that, at least on shorter horizons, it does
not represent a good way of modeling energy demand. In particular, a much lower input
elasticity is called for if one wants to explain the joint shorter- to medium-run movements
of input prices and input shares over the last half a century. However, on a longer horizon,
Cobb-Douglas is perhaps a more reasonable assumption, as input shares do not appear to
trend.20 Finally, as for the discount rate, we do not aim to take a stand here but report
results for a range of values.
We use standard values for ￿, ￿, and ￿ given by 0.3, 0:98510, and 0.03, respectively. The
discount factor corresponds the one used by Nordhaus. When we report the optima tax
rate, we do it as a function of the discount rate; thus, it is straightforward to read o⁄ the
implications of a much smaller larger value, such as Stern￿ s choice of 0.99910.
20Hassler, Krusell, and Olovsson (2011) also show that if technology is modeled as endogenous and poten-
tially directed to speci￿c factors, like energy or capital/labor, shares will settle down to robust intermediate
values￿ and thus have the Cobb-Douglas feature￿ even if the input substitution elasticities are as low as
zero.
245.1.2 The carbon cycle
The carbon emitted into the atmosphere by burning fossil fuel enters the global carbon circu-
lation system, where carbon is exchanged between various reservoirs such as the atmosphere,
the terrestrial biosphere, and di⁄erent layers of the ocean. When analyzing climate change
driven by the greenhouse e⁄ect, the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere is the key
climate driver. We therefore need to specify how emissions a⁄ect the atmospheric CO2 con-
centration over time. A seemingly natural way of doing this would be to set up a system of
linear di⁄erence equations in the amount of carbon in each reservoir. This approach is taken
by Nordhaus (2008) and Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), where three reservoirs are speci￿ed:
i. the atmosphere, ii. the biosphere/upper layers of the ocean, and iii. the deep oceans.
The parameters are then calibrated so that the two ￿rst reservoirs are quite quickly mixed
in a partial equilibrium. Biomass production reacts positively to more atmospheric carbon
and the exchange between the surface water of the oceans and the atmosphere also reach a
partial equilibrium quickly. The exchange with the third reservoir is, however, much slower.
Only a few percent of the excess carbon in the ￿rst two reservoirs trickles down to the deep
oceans every decade.
An important property of such a linear system is that the steady-state shares of carbon
in the di⁄erent reservoirs are independent of the aggregate stock of carbon. The stock of
carbon in the deep oceans is very large compared to the amount in the atmosphere and also
relative to the total amount of fossil fuel yet to be extracted. This means that of every unit
of carbon emitted now only a very small fraction will eventually end up in the atmosphere.
Thus, the linear model predicts that even heavy use of fossil fuel will not lead to high rates
of atmospheric CO2 concentration in the long run.
The linear model sketched above abstracts from important mechanisms. One regards
the exchange of carbon with the deep oceans; this, arguably, is the most important problem
with the linear speci￿cation just discussed (see, Archer, 2005, and Archer et al., 2009). The
problem is due to the Revelle bu⁄er factor (Revelle and Suess, 1957): as CO2 is accumulated
in the oceans the water is acidi￿ed, which in turn limits the capacity of the oceans to
absorb more CO2. This can reduce the e⁄ective ￿size" of the oceans as carbon reservoirs
dramatically. Archer (2005) argues that the decrease can be as large as a factor 1/15.
Very slowly, the acidity will then eventually decrease, and the pre-industrial equilibrium can
be restored. This process is so slow, however, that we can ignore it in economic models.
The IPCC 2007 report concludes that ￿About half of a CO2 pulse to the atmosphere is
removed over a timescale of 30 years; a further 30% is removed within a few centuries;
and the remaining 20% will typically stay in the atmosphere for many thousands of years￿
and the conclusion of Archer (2005) is that a good approximation is that 75% of an excess
atmospheric carbon concentration has a mean lifetime of 300 year and the remaining 25%
stays forever￿ . For our purposes, as shown above, what is key is the rate of depreciation
of the atmospheric carbon concentration in excess of the pre-industrial level. Thus, rather
than develop a nonlinear version of Nordhaus￿ s three-reservoir system, we just make direct
assumptions on these depreciation rates, which we allow to change over time. From our
perspective, thus, a simple, yet reasonable, representation of the carbon cycle is therefore
25that we describe in equation (6), where (i) a share ’L of carbon emitted into the atmosphere
stays there forever; (ii) another share, 1￿’0, of the remainder exits the atmosphere into the
biosphere and the surface oceans within a decade; and (iii) a remaining part, (1 ￿ ’L)’0,
decays (slowly) at a geometric rate ’: Thus, like Nordhaus, we use a linear speci￿cation,
but one with a di⁄erent interpretation and that implies qualitatively di⁄erent dynamics. We
show below that our formulation also has quantitative properties that are rather di⁄erent. In
fact, our formulation leads to signi￿cantly larger e⁄ects of human emissions on the climate.
We use the approximation of Archer (2005) to yield a half-life of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere of 30 periods. Hence, ’L is set to 20%, as in the IPCC report. The remaining
parameter ’0 is set so that d2 = 1




5.1.3 The damage function
We use an exponential damage function speci￿ed in Section 2.2.2 to approximate the cur-
rent state-of-the-art damage function which is given in Nordhaus (2007). Nordhaus uses a
proportional damage function speci￿ed as
1 ￿ DN (Tt) =
1
1 + ￿2T 2
t
;
where T is the mean global increase in temperature above the preindustrial level, with
￿2 = 0:0028388. The damage function DN is, due to the square of temperature in the
denominator, convex for a range of values up to some high temperature after which it is
concave (naturally, since it is bounded above by 1).
For our purposes, however, we need to express the damage function in terms of the stock
of atmospheric carbon, St. The standard assumption in the literature (say, as used in RICE)
is to let the global mean temperature be a logarithmic function of the stock of atmospheric
carbon:







where ￿ S = 581 GtC (gigatons of carbon) is the pre-industrial atmospheric CO2 concentration.
A standard value for the climate sensitivity parameter ￿ here is 3.0 degrees Celsius. Thus, we
assume that a doubling of the stock of atmospheric carbon leads to a 3-degree Celsius increase
in the global mean temperature. As noted above, there is substantial discussion and, perhaps
more importantly, uncertainty, about this parameter, among other things due to imperfect
understanding of feedback e⁄ects. Therefore, it is important to allow uncertainty, as we do
in this paper.
In summary, to obtain a mapping from the carbon dioxide concentration in the at-
mosphere to damages as a percent of GDP, one needs to combine DN(T) and T(S). This
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Figure 1: Net of damage function 1￿D(T (S)); Nordhaus (dashed) and exponential (solid)
1, we show the mapping according to Nordhaus￿ s calibration by plotting his 1￿DN (T (St))
(dashed) together with the damage function assumed in our analysis (solid): an exponential
function with parameter ￿t = 5:3 ￿ 10￿5: The range of the x axis is from 600 GtC, which
corresponds to preindustrial levels, to 3,000 GtC, which corresponds to the case when most
of predicted stocks of fossil fuel are burned over a fairly short period of time.21 Nordhaus￿ s
formulation implies an overall convexity for a range of values of S, which our function does
not exhibit. This convexity is not quantitatively large, however, and the two curves are quite
close. We thus conclude that our exponential approximation appears rather reasonable.
To incorporate uncertainty in our analysis is straightforward. Many structures are possi-
ble; we simply assume that until some random future date there is uncertainty regarding the
long-run value of ￿. At that date, uncertainty is resolved and either it turns out that ￿ will
be equal to ￿H or equal to ￿L, with ￿H > ￿L. The ex￿ante probability of the high value
is denoted p. Furthermore, we also assume that until the long-run value of ￿ is learned, the
current value ￿t will equal p￿H + (1 ￿ p)￿L ￿ ￿ ￿.22
What are the sources of the speci￿c damage parameters? When calibrating the damage
function, Nordhaus (2000) uses a bottom-up approach by collecting a large number of studies
on various e⁄ects of global warming. Some of these are positive, i.e., warming is bene￿cial,
but most are negative. By adding these estimates up he arrives at an estimate that a 2.5-
21For a discussion of the estimates of the total stocks, see Section 5.1.4 below.
22Pizer (1998) is an early study using uncertainty; Kelly and Kolstad (1999) also study Bayesian learning.
27degree Celsius heating yields a global (output-weighted) loss of 0.48% of GDP.23 Furthermore,
he argues, based on survey evidence, that with a probability of 6.8% the damages from a 6-
degree Celsius heating are catastrophically large, de￿ned as a loss of 30% of GDP. Nordhaus,
moreover, calculates the willingness to pay for such a risk and adds it to the damage function.
Here, because our analysis allows uncertainty, we can proceed slightly di⁄erently. We thus
directly use Nordhaus￿ s numbers to calibrate ￿H and ￿L. Speci￿cally, we use the 0.48% loss
at 3 degrees heating to calibrate ￿L (moderate damages) and the 30% loss at 6 degrees to
calibrate ￿H (catastrophic damages). Using (31) we ￿nd that a 2.5- and a 6-degree heating
occurs if St equals 1035 and 2324, respectively.
We thus calibrate ￿L to solve
e
￿￿L(1035￿581) = 0:9952
and ￿H to solve
e
￿￿H(2324￿581) = 0:70;
yielding ￿L = 1:060￿10￿5 and ￿H = 2:046￿10￿4. Using p = 0:068, we calculate an ex-ante
(current) damage cost ￿ ￿ of 2:379 ￿ 10￿5.
5.1.4 Energy
We model energy sources as a combination of oil and coal. We assume that coal and oil
are perfect substitutes. In the very short run, this is obviously unreasonable￿ we do not
drive our cars on coal. However, in the longer run, and for other energy uses, it seems quite
plausible to assume a high degree of substitutability. For example, coal can be converted to
liquid fuel that can used to run existing combustion engines. Formally, we assume
Et = Ect + cEot; (32)
where Ect and Eot are the period t consumption levels of coal and oil, respectively, and c
is the e¢ ciency of a unit of oil relative to that of a unit of coal. The fact that price per
ton of oil is several times higher than coal can be interpreted as representing higher general
e¢ ciency of oil. We use the di⁄erence in price to calibrate c in the analysis below.
In order to maintain tractability, along the lines of the above analysis, we make special
assumptions about extraction costs and scarcity values. The extraction cost for oil is set
to zero, since it is very small relative the market price at least for the very large on-shore
reserves in the Middle East. The marginal extraction cost for coal is set to a positive
constant, which is allowed to vary over time, while at the same time coal is assumed to be
in economically in￿nite supply. The latter assumption￿ no scarcity rent for coal￿ appears
plausible because the reserves of coal are very large compared to those for oil. Rogner (1997)
estimates global fossil fuel reserves, taking into account technical progress, to be over 5,000
23Reduced-form estimates, e.g. those in Mendelsohn and Nordhaus (1994) exploiting interregional di⁄er-
ences using cross-sectional data on temperatures and output from countries and regions within countries,
suggest higher damages but are of the same order of magnitude. The regression coe¢ cient on the ￿distance-
from-equator￿variable in Hall-Jones productivity regressions is a relative of the Mendelsohn-Nordhaus study.
28GtC of oil equivalents, i.e., enough for several hundreds of years at current consumption
levels. Of this, around 70% is coal and 16% is oil. This leads us to conclude that it is
reasonable to proceed with a case where in the optimal allocation, alternative energy sources
have replaced fossil fuel before fossil fuel reserves have been depleted. We do not model
alternative energy here but, since we think of it as appearing rather far into the future, we
do not view it as in￿ uencing the time horizon we are primarily looking at. To sum up,
our assumptions coincide with those in the previous section, but here oil and coal coexist.
Finally, we will employ a calibration such that in the optimal as well as the decentralized
equilibrium, the oil will be extracted ￿rst and coal only later. The reason is well known
and straightforward: it is better to use the cheapest resource ￿rst, in order to delay any
additional extraction costs.
We state the maximization problem and provide characterization of this problem in the
technical appendix to our paper.24 It is straightforwardly analyzed; the main complication is
in determining when the oil-to-coal switch will take place and whether both oil and coal will
be used in the last period of oil use.25 A key (and easily checked) feature of the combined
oil-coal model is that Ct=Yt again is constant for all t, so that the optimal tax on emissions
remains given by (13).
The marginal coal extraction cost is given by wt
Ac
t, where wt is the wage. Normalizing the
labor supply to unity, the wage, if no labor is used for coal extraction, is wt = (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)Yt.26
The 5-year average of coal prices between 2005 and 2009 of $74/ton.27;28 Under the assump-
tions that taxes currently are negligible and that the coal market is competitive, this price
equals the marginal carbon extraction cost. We thus apply these equations for t = 0, taken
in the middle of the previous decade. We use a yearly world GDP of 75 trillion US$, thus
amounting to 750 trillion US$ for a model time period.29 Given that a period in the model
is a decade, this delivers, after solving for Ac0,
Ac0 =
(1 ￿ 0:3 ￿ 0:03) ￿ 750 ￿ 1012
74 ￿ 109 = 6791=GtC:
Thus, a share 1
6791 of a decade￿ s labor supply is required for each gigaton of coal extracted.
To estimate the e¢ ciency di⁄erences between oil and coal, we calculate the average price
per ton of carbon content for oil relative to the coal price over the period 1990￿ 2009.30 The
24The technical appendix is available online at http://hassler-j.iies.su.se.
25With continuous time, the characterization of the switching is slightly easier. Then, the marginal value
(price) of the last unit oil is determined by the extraction cost at the time of the switch to coal. Before that,
oil use is determined by the Hotelling equation (26). Our discrete-time setting implies that either oil and
coal are used together during the last period of oil use or they are not; both outcomes are generic.
26We calibrate using current costs of coal extraction. Currently, a positive, though very small, share of
world labor is employed in coal extraction. However, if instead only coal was used, the wage would be
(1 ￿ ￿)Yt, producing only a minor di⁄erence in the quantitative results.
27U.S. Central Appalachian coal. Source: BP (2010).
28The 10-year average over 2000￿ 2009 is 58.8 dollars per ton.
29For these calculations, we use PPP-adjusted GDP from the CIA World Fact Book
(https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/).
30We use spot prices of Dubai crude oil per barrel from BP (2010) and convert this to tons by multiplying
29price per unit of coal is on average ￿ve times as high for oil as for coal: c = 5.
Another key parameter is the size of the oil reserve. BP (2010) reports that global proved
reserves of oil are 181.7 gigatons. However, these ￿gures only aggregate reserves that are
economically pro￿table to extract at current economic and technical conditions. Thus, they
are not aimed at measuring the total resource base taking into account in particular technical
progress, and they do not take into account the chance that new pro￿table oil reserves will
be discovered. Rogner (1997) instead estimates global reserves taking into account technical
progress, ending up at an estimate of over 5000 gigatons of oil equivalents.31 Of this, around
16% is oil, i.e., 800 GtC. We take as a benchmark that the existing stock of oil is 400 GtC,
i.e., somewhere well within the range of these two estimates. We also assume that there is
growth in both extraction e¢ ciency and population so that Ac
tNt grows at the rate 1% per
year.
5.2 Results
We now show the implications of our calibrated model, beginning with the marginal exter-
nality damage of emissions.
5.2.1 The marginal externality damage and the optimal tax
Recall that the marginal externality damage of emissions￿ or, alternatively, the optimal tax
on emissions￿ is characterized by Proposition 1. This tax depends only on the parameters
￿, ￿ and the ’s and is independent of the other parameters of the model and of initial
conditions. We calculate the optimal taxes both before and after we have learnt the long-
run value of ￿. We use (14) and express the tax per ton of emitted carbon at a yearly global
output of 70 trillion dollars. In Figure 2, we plot the three tax rates against the yearly
subjective discount rate.
Two important and much-discussed policy proposals have been made so far: that in
Nordhaus (2000) and that in the Stern report (Stern, 2007). These proposals amount to
a tax of $30 and $250 dollar per ton coal, respectively. A key di⁄erence between the two
proposals is that they use very di⁄erent subjective discount rates. Nordhaus uses a rate of
1.5% per year, mostly based on market measures. Stern, who adds a ￿moral￿ concern for
future generations, uses the much lower rate of 0.1% per year. In Figure 2, we plot the
optimal taxes for a range of yearly subjective discount rate (the solid line is the ex-ante
tax before the uncertainty is realized, the upper and lower dashed lines are, respectively,
the optimal taxes for the high and low values of damages after the true value of damages
is known). For these two values of the discount rate, the optimal taxes using our analysis
are $56.9/ton and $496/ton, respectively. Thus, our calculations suggest a substantially
larger optimal tax than both these studies. This di⁄erence is due to a number of factors;
one factor is that our depreciation structure for carbon in the atmosphere, as calibrated,
by 7.33 barrels per ton and use a carbon content of 85%. For the coal price, we use the price of US Central
Appalachian coal from BP (2010).
31By expressing quantities in oil equivalents, the di⁄erence in energy content between natural gas, oil, and
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Figure 2: Optimal tax rates in current dollars/ton of emitted fossil carbon vs. yearly sub-
jective discount rate.
31implies that more carbon stays, and stays longer, in the atmosphere. Other factors include
di⁄erent utility-function curvatures and di⁄erent temperature dynamics; we discuss all of
these in detail in Section 5.2.3. Furthermore, we see that the consequences of learning are
dramatic. With a discount rate of 1.5%, the optimal tax rate if damages turns out to be
moderate is $25.3/ton but $489/ton if they are catastrophic. For the low discount rate, the
corresponding values are $221/ton and a whopping $4,263/ton.
It is useful to relate these numbers to taxes used in practice. Here, we report that Swedish
taxes on the private consumption of fossil fuel in fact are above our estimate based on the
low discount rate (i.e., above $500/ton). In 2010, the tax is 1.05 SEK per kilo emitted
CO2 (Swedish Tax Agency, 2010) corresponding to a tax per ton of carbon of $US 600.32
A conclusion from this is that the Swedish consumption taxes, even from the perspective
of Stern-level discounting, are actually too high. Furthermore, to justify the level of the
Swedish carbon tax on private households, even if the intention of Swedish policymakers
is to do what is best for the world, is harder still, because of ￿carbon leakage￿ , i.e., the
idea that if one country lowers its demand for energy, world prices are reduced and other
countries might demand more.33 To take this into account, one would obviously need a
model with more than one region. Finally, it turns out that our damages estimates/optimal
taxes for standard discount rates are quite close to observed values of traded emission rights;
we discuss the details in the concluding section.
It should be noted that the large di⁄erence in the assumed discounting between Nordhaus
and Stern has implications for other aspects of the model too. If one uses Stern￿ s discount
rate, in particular, it follows that the laissez-faire equilibrium gives much too little saving
(and much too high a market interest rate), calling for major subsidies to saving as well.
Stern￿ s view is not necessarily that capital accumulation is too low, but it is challenging
to provide a theoretically consistent model where di⁄erent discounting should be applied to
di⁄erent forward-looking decisions. One such model is that in Sterner and Persson (2008),
who model the demand for environmental goods explicitly and assume a non-homotheticity
in utility leading to trend growth in relative prices and implications for discounting that
potentially can justify Stern￿ s position.
Does our analysis have implications for whether one (i.e., a global union of countries)
should use taxes or quantities￿ cap and trade￿ for attaining the full optimum? In the model
discussed, so long as there is no restriction either on tax rates or on quantity limits (they
need to be allowed to vary over time and across states of nature), there is in principle no
di⁄erence between tax and quantity measures. At the same time, our model reveals a new
argument for taxes: the optimal tax formula does not, as long as the assumptions allowing
us to derive it are met, require any speci￿c knowledge about available stocks of fossil fuel,
32A kilo of CO2 contains 0:27 kilos of carbon. Using an exchange rate of 6.30 SEK/$, this yields a tax of
$617.28/tC. Swedish taxes on industrial consumption of fossil fuel are substantially lower.
33The most straightforward concrete illustration of this is a one-period model with an inelastically supplied
amount of fossil fuel (say, because extraction costs are negligible): then whatever demand is withdrawn from
one country will be exactly o⁄set by an identical increase in other countries, and no single country can
in￿ uence outcomes with unilateral tax increases.
32technology or population growth rates, or more generally about anything beyond the three
sets of parameters in the formula. Quantity restrictions, on the other hand, demand much
more knowledge; in fact, they require knowledge of all the remaining aspects of the model.
As we shall see below, it is not di¢ cult to generate quantity paths once these assumptions are
made, but so much is unknown about both total current (and yet-to-be-discovered) stocks
as well as about di⁄erent kinds of technological change to occur in the future that one would
need to worry greatly about possible quantity misjudgments.
5.2.2 Implications for the future: climate, damages, and output
Given the assumptions made in Section 5.1.4 about oil and coal reserves, etc. (in addition
to the assumptions underlying the optimal tax rates), we can now generate quantity paths
very easily for all variables of interest both with and without optimal policy.34 We leave the
details of the model solution to the technical appendix and summarize the results here. The
results reported refer to the case where the damage parameter ￿ remains, throughout time,
at its expected level (signi￿cant adjustments apply in the two cases of a much higher, or a
much lower, value of ￿).
The use of fossil fuel in the optimal allocation and in laissez faire are depicted in Figure
3. Comparing the two outcomes, we ￿nd that optimal policy demands a rather signi￿cant
delay of oil consumption. The no-tax market economy would ￿nish the oil supplies in three
decades, whereas optimal taxation would let oil be used for six decades. After the oil supply
is used up, coal use increases due to technical progress. The increase is particularly rapid
under laissez faire.
The paths for total damages are plotted in Figure 4 below. There are signi￿cant, though
not enormous, gains from raising taxes to the optimal level. The gains in the short run
are rather small, but start growing after around 50 years and reach 4.2% of GDP after a
hundred years. In the very long run, a share ’L = 0:2 of emitted fossil carbon remains in
the atmosphere, implying a permanent damage of 2.8% and 1.1% percent of GDP.35
Similarly, by using the relation between carbon concentration in the atmosphere and the
temperature￿ using the functional forms above where T depends logarithmically on S￿ we
can also compute the climate outcomes under the optimal and the market allocations. The
results are summarized in Figure 5 below. We predict a market economy with a signi￿cant
temperature increase that accelerates at the time when coal is replacing oil as the energy
source. This acceleration is due to our assumption that coal is a substantially less e¢ cient
source of energy per unit of carbon than oil. The temperature will peak at 7.7 degrees
Celsius a little over 100 years from now. The optimal allocation dictates a signi￿cant delay
in warming due to the longer oil use, by about two decades, with a peak at 4.6 degrees
Celsius. Note, however, that this is measured relative to the pre-industrial level. Relative
to the model￿ s prediction for the current temperature, the increases are almost two degrees
smaller.36
34As discussed above, the combined oil-coal model can be solved easily for the optimum, and it is equally
straightforward to solve for the competitive equilibrium without taxes, or with suboptimal taxes.
35Needless to say, the true permanent e⁄ect of global warming is very uncertain.












Figure 3: Fossil fuel use per year in Gt of oil equivalents in optimal allocation (lower curve)















Figure 4: Damages in percent of GDP in optimal allocation (lower curve) and laissez faire
(upper curve).















Figure 5: Increase in global mean temperature (Celcius) over pre-industrial levels in optimal
allocation (lower curve) and laissez faire (upper curve)
Finally, we show the evolution of relative (net-of-damage) production of ￿nal-good output
(GDP) in Figure 6 below. The optimal allocation involves short-run losses in GDP at around
1%, due to lower fossil fuel use. Of course, in the longer run, GDP regains (since GDP is
measured net of damages) and is about the same percentage higher than under laissez faire,
but in perpetuity. Output in the optimal allocation exceeds that in laissez faire from 2050.
The ￿rst period coal is used in the optimal allocation, 2070, relative output falls slightly due
to the fact that substantial labor resources then needs to be reallocated to coal extraction.
However, GDP remains substantially above that in laissez faire. After the fossil fuel era is
over, the CO2 concentration very slowly decays at a rate given by the assumption half of the
excess carbon is removed over three hundred years.
It is important to reiterate that the paths estimated above assume constant damage
coe¢ cients equalling the appropriate expected values calibrated above. Clearly, to the extent
damages, for example because feedback e⁄ects are stronger than expected, are much higher,
the above paths would need to be adjusted upward (and a similar adjustment downward is
of course possible too). Similarly, the e⁄ects of adopting Stern￿ s proposed discount factor
instead of Nordhaus￿ s would also be major in terms of the di⁄erence between the optimum
and the laissez-faire outcomes.
We have also calculated the optimal and laissez-faire allocations under the alternative
Our model over-predicts the current temperature by around one degree. A common explanation for this is
that anthropogenic aerosols lead to a cooling e⁄ect, temporarily masking the full impact of greenhouse gases
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Figure 6: Final-good output (GDP) in optimal allocation relative to that in laissez faire
assumption that there is 600 Gt of oil reserves, i.e., 50% more than in the baseline calibration.
A key di⁄erence is that with more oil, the di⁄erence between the two allocations becomes
larger. Speci￿cally, the initial drop in output due to the introduction of the optimal CO2 tax
(that we note is independent of the oil reserves if expressed as a share of GDP) is slightly
larger with more oil (1.30% rather than 1.05%). Furthermore, the local peak in relative
output that occurs at the end of the oil period is larger, at over 104.6% rather than at
102.6%.
5.2.3 Robustness
We now discuss how our optimal taxation results are a⁄ected by changes in the benchmark
model. First, suppose the utility function is in the more general power-function class (i.e.,
constant relative risk aversion and constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution). In par-
ticular, consider the version of equation (13), with saving rates inserted, when the coe¢ cient
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With maintained other assumptions there are two key implications to consider of higher
curvature: (i) de-facto discounting, as given by ￿j, changes since marginal utility will shrink
36at a rate that is not equal to the rate of consumption growth; and (ii) there are transitional
dynamics in the saving rate. Moreover, through all these e⁄ects, all the remaining elements
of the calibration (technology growth, etc.) re-enter and a⁄ect the marginal externality
damage. If there is consumption growth and curvature is higher than for log, discounting
goes up, making for smaller externalities of current emissions. Regarding movements in the
saving rate, transitional dynamics in the capital stock are slowed down with higher utility
curvature than log. This makes the saving rate increase over time when capital starts below
steady state￿ slower adjustment to steady state implies slower capital accumulation, and
hence initially lower saving rates.37 Thus, if the economy starts below steady state and there
is higher curvature than log, the movements in saving rates will increase the externality,
thus counteracting the discounting e⁄ect. Unless there is much more than log curvature,
these e⁄ects will not produce a large quantitative departure from the results based on the
benchmark model.
Second, if there is less than 100% depreciation, which is reasonable to assume for 10-
year time horizons, transition is also slowed down, and saving rates will change over time.
Equation (33) above for the marginal externality damage continues to hold; maintaining
logarithmic utility, the only new implication then occurs due to non-constant saving rates.
If the economy starts below the steady state, the saving rates will decline over time. The
quantitative magnitude of this e⁄ect depends on how far from the steady state, or balanced
growth path, the economy is initially. In typical macroeconomic applications, and apart from
high-frequency variations in capacity utilization, the general presumption appears to be that
we are close to a balanced growth path. From the perspective of the world economy, this is
arguably also true, though here one would think of di⁄erent countries (or, more generally,
subregions) being on di⁄erent relative levels due to di⁄erences in policy, institutions, and so
on; see Acemoglu (2009) and Jones (2002) for discussions. The distribution of countries has
remained fairly constant over the last 60 or so years. Transitional dynamics in the factors
making countries di⁄erent would generate non-constancy of world saving rates, but there is
no consensus on the nature of such dynamics, to the extent it is even expected to occur.38
Third, looking at conditions on technology under which saving rates would not be con-
stant, suppose the production function is not Cobb-Douglas between energy and the other
factors (capital and labor). Less than unitary input substitutability here does appear realis-
tic; as illustrated in Hassler, Krusell, and Olovsson (2011), on a medium to high frequency,
the share of fossil fuel in costs is highly correlated with its price (but there does not appear
to be a long-run trend in the share). How much saving-rate movements would be implied by
such a setting? Consider extreme complementarity within the class of constant substitution
37With long-run growth there is also an e⁄ect of curvature on the balanced-growth saving rate￿ it falls in
curvature.
38For example, if di⁄erences in GDP across countries were due to di⁄erences in saving rates alone, one
could hypothesize further that such di⁄erences are due to, say, di⁄erential taxation, broadly de￿ned, of
capital income/entrepreneurial activity. However, di⁄erences in saving rate account for only about 20% of
the total income di⁄erences; a similar share is accounted for by human-capital di⁄erences, and the remainder
by total-factor productivity di⁄erences. What factors in￿ uence the accumulation of these other sources of
income, and the associated transitional dynamics, is even less clear.
37elasticity: output is Leontief in AK￿l1￿￿ and AEE.39 Again, there is a balanced growth path
(whose properties depend on how fast A and AE grow), and the question is how saving rates
vary during the transition. Here, it appears reasonable to assume that K (or A, relative to
AE) is low initially, as this will deliver increasing energy use over time, something which we
have observed over a long period of time.40 This implies high initial saving rates. Hassler,
Krusell, and Olovsson (2011) solve such a model and the implied transition dynamics are
rather quick. Thus, an extension even to the extreme Leontief formulation is unlikely to give
very di⁄erent optimal-taxation results than implied by the formula based on constant saving
rates.
Di⁄erent assumptions regarding the extraction of fossil fuels, or energy production more
generally, can also lead to time-varying saving rates. However, since the share of fossil fuel
is less than 5% of total output, extensions in this direction will only change the optimal-
taxation results marginally.
What are the consequences of di⁄erent formulations of how/where the damages occur?
Here, one can imagine a variety of alternative formulations, and speculating about all of these
goes beyond the scope of the present analysis. One formulation that is commonly considered
(say, in van der Ploeg and Withagen, 2010), is an additive damage in utility: U(C;S) =










and thus the computation of the damage would require knowing the implications for the
future path of carbon in the atmosphere St+j, something which is not required with our
formulation. Under the assumption that V is linear, however, the formula would again be in
closed form as a function of deep parameters only (except for the appearance of the initial,
endogenous saving rate). Linearity is arguably not too extreme a simpli￿cation, since the
composition of a concave S-to-temperature mapping with a convex temperature-to-damage
function may be close to linear. Other utility-function generalizations, such as that by
Sterner and Persson (2008) discussed above, would change our formula more fundamentally.
Allowing technologies for carbon capture is straightforward. If such technologies are used
at the source of emissions, the tax rate should apply to emissions rather than fossil fuel use.
The fact that the tax rate re￿ ects the social cost of emission implies that it also re￿ ects
the social value of removing CO2 from the atmosphere. Capturing CO2 directly from the
atmosphere should thus be subsidized at the rate of the optimal tax rate.
More broadly, the model here regards the world as one region. Realistically, one would
want to have a model which aggregates explicitly over regions. Will such a model feature an
aggregation theorem, allowing a one-region representation? Di⁄erent contributions to the
macroeconomic literature on inequality￿ between consumers and between ￿rms￿ suggest
39Two technology factors are now relevant; in the Cobb-Douglas case, they factorize into one.
40A model with unitary elasticity features energy use that is declining over time, at least in the case of oil
with zero extraction costs.
38that whereas there will not be exact aggregation, at least if intertemporal and insurance
markets are operating with some frictions, there may well be approximate aggregation; see
Krusell and Smith (1998, 2006), Angeletos and Calvet (2006), Angeletos (2007), and Covas
(2006). However, to our knowledge, there are no calibrated medium- to long-run models of
the world economy in the literature, and the extent to which approximate aggregation would
hold in such a model is an open question.
The above discussion focuses on the robustness of the optimal-tax formula. How would
our predictions for output, the temperature, energy use, and so on change if one considered
the generalizations just discussed? These predictions are more sensitive to our assumptions.
First, unlike our basic tax formula, they require knowledge of how all variables in the model
develop: all exogenous parameters matter. For example, what happens to energy use over
time depends critically on the details of how the supply of energy is modeled, fossil fuel-based
and other, including any technological change that would in￿ uence it. We expect that many
of the predictions, however, will not be so sensitive to assumptions, like those for damages
and temperature; these will inherit the same uncertainty as are contained in our tax formula,
namely that over ￿ and the ’s.
Before concluding, let us relate our results to the state-of-the art analysis conducted by
Nordhaus (2007).41 In particular, we will compare to his calculation of the optimal CO2
tax.42 Nordhaus reports an optimal tax of $27 for 2005 that should rise to $42 in 2015.
Nordhaus uses a subjective discount rate of 1.5% per year at which out tax formula yields a
tax rate of $56 dollars. However, we should note that Nordhaus uses a CRRA utility function
with an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 1
2: He calibrates the subjective discount
rate to yield a net return of capital of 5.5%. For log utility, as we use, he reports that the
subjective discount rate should be 3% to match the 5.5% capital return with only negligible
e⁄ects on the optimal tax rate. Thus, taking into account the di⁄erent utility functions, a
more reasonable comparison is with our prescription for 3% subjective discounting. For this
discount rate, our formula yields $32, which makes our results even more in line. However,
a closer inspection implies that there are a number of countervailing e⁄ects behind this
similarity.
41A review of the many, rather comprehensive, studies with various degrees of integration between the
climate and the economy is beyond the scope here; many of these are extremely detailed and realistic in their
focus than our present analysis. The paper by Leach (2007) is a particularly close relative of the current
work￿ a numerically solved DGE model in the spirit of DICE. Weyant (1996) gives a detailed assessment and
Weyant (2000) summarizes the main commonalities and di⁄erences behind the most widely used models. A
more recent comprehensive analysis (Clarke et al., 2009) is an overview of the EMF 22 International Scenarios
of the ten leading integrated assessment models used to analyze the climate actions proposed in the current
international negotiations. Speci￿cally, they discuss the impact on the climate and the costs of the three
policy initiatives: (1) the long-term climate target, (2) whether or not this target can be temporarily overshot
prior to 2100; (3) and assessment of such impacts depending on when various regions would participate in
emissions mitigation. For the US economy, Jorgenson et al. (2008) examine the e⁄ect on the U.S. economy
of predicted impacts in key market activities using a computable general equilibrium model with multiple
sectors. McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1999) is another important multi-country, multi-sector intertemporal
general-equilibrium model that has been used for a variety of policy analyses.
42Details of this comparison are available upon request.
39First, we deal with uncertainty in di⁄erent ways. Nordhaus uses a ￿certainty-equivalent
damage function￿ , i.e., he optimizes under certainty. If we use the same approach, and
calibrate our exponential damage function to match Nordhaus￿ s damage function directly,
our optimal tax rates are higher by more than a factor two.
Second, there are important di⁄erences in the modeling of the carbon cycle. Speci￿cally,
while we assume that almost a half of the emissions are absorbed by the biosphere and the
upper layers of the ocean within 10 years, Nordhaus assumes away such a within-period
absorbtion completely. Using Nordhaus￿ s carbon cycle would again lead to higher tax rates
in our model; how much would depend on the subjective discount rate (at 3% discounting,
we would need to adjust tax rates upward by a factor 1.5).
Nordhaus, ￿nally, uses a more complicated climate model, where, in particular, the ocean
creates a drag on the temperature; in contrast, we assume an immediate impact of the
CO2 concentration on temperature.43 Of course, this biases our estimate upwards, and
more so the larger is the discount rate. It can be shown that by adjusting our carbon
depreciation structure ds in a very simple way, we can approximate the temperature response
of a CO2 emissions that follows from Nordhaus assumptions rather well. By doing so, we take
into account the di⁄erences in assumptions on the carbon cycle as well as on the dynamic
temperature e⁄ects of emissions. A good ￿t is achieved by lagging the response by one
period (setting d0 = 1) and then multiplying 1 ￿ ds by 1
2 for all s: Using this adjusted
depreciation structure in combination with a damage function that approximates the one
used by Nordhaus, we obtain an optimal tax of $37.6, which is almost identical to the one
calculated by Nordhaus.
Although our model is non-linear, it does not incorporate so-called threshold e⁄ects.
Thresholds refer to literal discontinuities (or ￿very strong non-linearities￿ ) in some of the
model relationships. Such phenomena are usually argued to occur in the feedback between
the carbon cycle and the climate. E.g., it has been argued that if the global temperature rises
enough, it could trigger a large amount of ￿new￿additional greenhouse gas emissions, such as
leakage from methane reservoirs near the surface of the arctic tundra. We follow Nordhaus,
however, in not explicitly incorporating strong non-linearities. In our model, the appearance
of this kind of non-linearity would be in the damage function: as the elasticity ￿ depending
explicitly on atmospheric carbon S. As we showed above, Nordhaus￿ s damage function
mapping S to damages￿ which we approximate rather closely￿ does have some convexity
but this convexity is weak and, for higher levels of S, turns into a concavity. The di¢ culty
of incorporating a non-convexity is not an analytical one￿ it can be rather straightforwardly
analyzed using our setting, with some more reliance of numerical methods￿ but rather a
quantitative one: at what levels of S does a nonlinearity appear, and what is its nature?
There does not appear to be anything near a consensus among scientists on these issues,
let alone on the issue of whether threshold e⁄ects are at all relevant. Therefore, Nordhaus￿ s
43Recent work by Roe and Bauman (2011) show that it is important to take this drag e⁄ect into account
if the climate sensitivity (￿ in our analysis) is high, but much less so for more moderate values like the ones
we have used. When dealing with an uncertain climate sensitivity including very large but unlikely values,
this may be a relevant concern.
40approach seems reasonable at the present level of scienti￿c understanding of the links between
the carbon cycle and the climate. Finally, one must be reminded that several aspects of our
model have elements that are often mentioned in the context of threshold e⁄ects; one is
the fact that a signi￿cant fraction of emissions stay forever in the atmosphere (a feature
motivated by the acidi￿cation of the oceans) and another is our explicit consideration of a
probabilistic catastrophe scenario (a very high ￿).
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have formulated a DSGE model of the world, treated as a uniform region
inhabited by a representative consumer dynasty, where there is a global externality from
emitting carbon dioxide, a by-product of using fossil fuel as an energy input into production.
We showed that, under quite plausible assumptions, the model delivers a closed-form formula
for the marginal externality damage of emissions. Due to standard Pigou reasoning￿ if a
tax is introduced that makes the user internalize the externality, the outcome is optimal￿
the formula also expresses the optimal tax on carbon emissions. We evaluated this formula
quantitatively and found results that are about twice the size of those put forth by Nordhaus
and Boyer (2000). The di⁄erence between our ￿ndings are due to a variety of di⁄erences
in assumption, e.g., the carbon depreciation structure. However, it is possible to arrive at
estimates that are very close to Nordhaus￿ s by making appropriate adjustments to carbon
depreciation rates, the discount rates, utility-function curvatures, and lags in temperature
dynamics. Stern (2007) arrives at much higher estimates; if we simply adjust our subjective
discount rate down to the level advocated in his report, we obtain an optimal tax rate that
is about twice of his.
Our estimate, for a discount rate of 1.5% per annum, is that the marginal externality
damage cost is a little under $60 per ton of carbon; for a discount rate of 0.1%, it is about
$500 per ton. We also argued that the optimal-tax computation relying on our closed form
is likely robust to a number of extensions. Put in terms of projections for future taxes, our
optimal-tax computation robustly implies a declining value-added tax on fossil energy use.44
To relate our estimates to actually implemented carbon taxes, consider Sweden, where the
tax on private consumption of carbon actually exceeds $600 per ton. Though industrial
carbon use is subsidized relative to private consumption in Sweden, these rates are very
high from a world-wide perspective. Whether they are also too high, even with Stern￿ s
discounting assumption and even if Swedish policymakers truly take the whole world￿ s utility
into account, because our high taxes may induce higher fossil-fuel use elsewhere (￿carbon
leakage￿ ) is an interesting issue. This issue, however, requires a more elaborate model for
a meaningful evaluation. We may also relate our ￿ndings to the price of emission rights
in the European Union Emission Trading System, in operation since 2005 and covering
large CO2 emitters in the EU. After collapsing during the great recession of 2008-09, the
price has hovered around 15 Euro per ton CO2; at an exchange rate of 1.4 dollar per Euro
44It should also be pointed out that we have in mind a tax on emissions; energy use based on clean energy
should not be taxed, and any negative emissions should be subsidized.
41corresponding to US$77 per ton carbon.45;46 This price is more in line with the optimal tax
rates we ￿nd for standard discount rates.
Based on further assumptions about fossil fuel stocks and their extraction technologies
and about important sources of output growth, such as TFP growth, we then computed
paths for our key variables for a laissez-faire market economy and compared them to the
optimal outcome. In the optimal outcome, oil extraction and use is prolonged over time￿ it
will be exhausted over a twice as long period as under laissez-faire￿ and coal use is about
half of that without taxes. The temperature increase will be limited to 4.5 degrees Celsius
under the optimal outcome and will be over three degrees higher under laissez-faire. Total
damages will rise over time and amount to a maximum of close to 7% of GDP, in a bit
over 100 years from now; the optimal outcome generates at most a 2.5% GDP loss. These
numbers all refer to an estimate of the damage elasticity￿ how much an extra unit of CO2
in the atmosphere will decrease output in percentage terms￿ that is the baseline considered
in Nordhaus and Boyer (2000). It is well known, however, that the damages may turn out
to be much higher, either because a given carbon concentration will in￿ uence temperatures
more (see, e.g., Roe and Baker, 2007, or Weitzman, 2009) or because the damages implied
by any additional warming will be higher; but, of course, they can be lower, too. These
numbers, and our optimal-tax prescription, should be revised up or down as more accurate
measures of the damage elasticity become available; until then, it is optimal to keep it at
our prescribed level.
As already mentioned, our tax formula has the very important feature that little about
the economy needs to be known to compute the tax rate: one neither needs information
about the precise sources of energy￿ fossil or not￿ nor about the future paths of population
growth and technical change (energy-speci￿c or other). Quantity restrictions that would
implement the optimum, i.e., a ￿cap-and-trade￿system, are equally good in principle: if
the entire model is known. That is, to compute optimal quantity restrictions, one would
critically need to know the many details that go into computing the endogenous variables
in our model, for example the available stocks of fossil fuels, their extraction costs, and
technological change in alternative energy technologies. Since our optimal-tax formula does
not depend on these assumptions, we believe to have uncovered an important advantage
of using taxes over using quantity restrictions. Other pros and cons of taxes and quantity
restrictions, we believe, remain.
It is also important to realize that our optimal-tax prescription holds whether or not
energy technology is provided endogenously. In terms of formal analysis, endogenous tech-
nology choice￿ not formally spelled out in this version of our paper￿ simply amounts to
more model equations and more ￿rst-order conditions, the outcome of which might in￿ uence
consumption and output, as well as what sources of energy are in use at di⁄erent points in
time. But since none of these variables appear in our central formula, the formula remains
intact. An implication of this is that if taxes are set according to our formula, there is no a
45The price of of EU emissions allowances can be found on the homepage of the European Energy Exchange,
http://www.eex.com/.
46A ton of CO2 contains 0.273 tons of carbon, implying a conversion factor of 0:273￿1 = 3:66:
42priori need to subsidize alternative (￿clean￿ ) technology relative to other kinds of technol-
ogy, at least not from the perspective of climate change. Such subsidization￿ and a possible
Green Paradox (Sinn, 2008)￿ would of course be relevant policy issues if the optimal carbon
tax cannot be implemented for some reason. Moreover, it seems reasonable that technology
accumulation in general, and that for green technology in particular, ought to be subsidized,
since there are arguably important externalities associated with R&D. It is far from clear,
however, that there should be favorable treatment of green R&D in the presence of an opti-
mal carbon tax. An argument in favor of this has been proposed in important recent work:
Acemoglu et al. (2010) show that green-technology R&D should be favored even under an
optimal carbon tax; the reason is a built-in path dependence where reliance on fossil energy
eventually would lead to a disaster, motivating early e⁄orts to switch to alternatives. We
conjecture that if the present model were to be enhanced with a choice between green and
fossil energy technologies, then it would be optimal to subsidize both, and rather symmet-
rically, given that an optimal carbon tax has been adopted.47 Of course, this is not to say
that it is feasible to implement the optimal tax: for this, worldwide agreement is needed. As
a general conclusion, no general insights are yet available here, and further research in this
area should be quite valuable.
Finally, it should be clear from our discussions of the model throughout the text that
many extensions to the present setting are desirable. One advantage of the simplicity/trac-
tability our model o⁄ers is precisely that extensions come at a low cost. Work in several
directions along the lines of the present setting is already in progress (see Krusell and Smith,
2009, for multi-regional modeling, Hassler, Krusell, and Olovsson, 2011, for some produc-
tivity accounting and an examination of endogenous technology, and Gars, Golosov, and
Tsyvinski, 2009 for a model with a back-stop technology).
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